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The European Institute of Public Administration is
currently conducting a two-year research project on
“Governance by Committee: the Role of Committees in
European Policy Making and Policy Implementation”.
The research is partly funded by the key action “Improving
Human Potential and the Socio-Economic Knowledge
Base” within the Fifth Framework Programme for
Research of the European Community.
Introduction
The proliferation of different types of committees
performing different functions in the political process
characterises contemporary governance at the national,
sub-national (regional and local) and supranational
(European) levels of government.1 The increasing role of
committees can be seen as a response to the need for an
ever-higher level of technical expertise, which stems
from the growing complexity of regulating contemporary
western societies. In multi-level governance systems
such as federal political systems, committees also perform
another function: they are mechanisms ensuring efficient
co-ordination between the different levels of government.2
The growing regulatory tasks of the European Community
and the need for multi-level co-ordination explain why
the committee system is so highly developed in the EC.
A basic typology identifies five different types of
committees involved in different stages of the EC decision-
making process:
• The expert committees, which provide the Commission
with external advice during the drawing up of
proposals;
• The institutions with consultative status such as the
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee
of the Regions;
• The working parties and the Committee of Permanent
Representatives (COREPER) which prepare the
decisions of the Council of Ministers;
• The standing committees of the European Parliament,
through which the latter exercises its legislative
powers;
• The  comitology committees, which assist the
Commission in exercising the implementing functions
delegated to it by the Council and the Parliament.
Theoretically-informed empirical research on the role
and function of committees in the EC policy process
commenced only a few years ago. Recent publications
have contributed to developing typologies of the different
types of committees according to their roles and their
internal rules of procedures. Much attention has also been
drawn to the inter-institutional debate on comitology
committees. Most of the research has been essentially
descriptive, trying to assess the functions of the different
kinds of committees in the EC policy process such as:
providing technical expertise, rule-setting, fund-
approving, consensus-building, inter-level co-ordination,
networking and influencing policy.
Building on this body of research, the project focuses
on the question of to what extent and how different
committees in the EC policy process go beyond their
basic functions as providers of technical expertise and
fora for multi-level co-ordination and constitute a central
aspect of the “democratic legitimacy” of the European
Union. Furthermore, a major task of the research project
is to analyse how expert knowledge is integrated into the
decision-making process of Parliament and Council, and
to what extent the prerogatives of the legislative authorities
are observed or violated in the implementation process,
i.e. how experts with different loyalties “check and
balance” each other in the European system of governance.
Committee structures and processes vary from one
policy area to another. The research concentrates on five
different policy fields (internal market – in particular
telecommunications, the environment, research and
development, social affairs and culture). Furthermore, it
focuses on committees in the legislative process (the
standing committees of the European Parliament and the
committees and working parties of the Council) and in the
policy implementation process (comitology committees).
These three types of committees will be analysed in
different subprojects. In addition, a forth subproject will
focus on the legitimacy of as well as citizens’ perceptions
of the EC Committee system.
1. The standing committees of the European
Parliament
The legislative role of the European Parliament has been
strengthened significantly since the Single European
Act. By introducing the co-decision procedure, the Treaty
of Maastricht put the European Parliament and the Council
on an equal footing in the legislative process in certain
policy areas. This right, which was simplified and extended
by the Treaty of Amsterdam, has established the Parliament
as co-legislator in areas including employment, the
environment, health and consumer protection, equal
opportunities and treatment for men and women, and
transport policy.
In dealing with these increasing powers, the standing
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parliamentary committees play an important role. They
have been described as the “legislative backbone” of the
European Parliament.3 Their competences are laid down
in the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament.4
All legislative proposals must be considered in one of the
17 standing committees, which can propose draft
amendments to Commission proposals or Council
common positions. Requests made by the EP to the
Commission for legislative proposals must be based on
reports initiated by a committee. Committees can table
questions to the Council, the Commission and to external
experts, table resolutions following statements by other
Community institutions and propose amendments to the
plenary agenda.
This subproject
• documents how the committees of the European
Parliament contribute to the shaping of EC law by
incorporating expert advice into their committees;
• assesses the impact of outside influence such as
national political parties, national governments, lobby-
groups, etc.;
• analyses the manner and effectiveness of the control
the committees exercise over other EU institutions (in
particular the Commission and the Council);
• examines the possibility of scrutiny of and control
over the implementation process with a view to
establishing realistic procedures for controlling the
implementation process.
2. Committees and working parties of the Council
The working parties or working groups of the Council are
composed of civil servants and diplomats belonging
either to the Permanent Representations of the Member
States or to their national administrations. They prepare
the meetings of COREPER, which in turn prepares the
meetings of the Council of Ministers. Issues which have
been agreed upon in working groups (where no formal
vote takes place) are formally endorsed by COREPER,
whereas issues on which no agreement has been reached
are re-negotiated in COREPER (and later in the Council
if necessary).
Although not mentioned in the Treaties (they are only
referred to in the Council’s Rules of Procedure5), the
working groups are a major element of the Council
machinery: According to a list of the Belgian Permanent
Representation, there were estimated to be 170 working
groups functioning during the Belgian Council Presidency
of 1993.6 In 1994, 2,580 meetings of working groups
were counted, as opposed to 125 meetings of the Council
of Ministers and 117 meetings of COREPER.7 Even more
impressive when considering the importance of the
working groups in the decision-making process are the
estimations according to which 70 to 80 % of the legal
acts adopted by Council are decided at the level of the
working groups.8
These quantitative estimations do not, however,
provide any answers to questions of a more qualitative
nature as regards the content of the negotiations which
take place in the working groups. In this context, the
research analyses whether the decisions taken in the
working groups are of a purely technical nature, or
whether they have far-reaching political implications.
Furthermore, the negotiation style in the working
groups is examined: To what extent are the negotiations
“open”? What room for manoeuvre from their national
administrations do the members of the working groups
have? To what extent do domestic constraints (inter-
ministerial co-ordination for instance) influence the
behaviour of the members of working groups? Does this
vary from one Member State to another? How do coalitions
usually work between the national delegations? How
influential are the representatives of the Member State
holding the Presidency and of the Commission in working
parties? To what extent do all these parameters vary
according to the sector involved (and the corresponding
legislative procedure)?
3. Comitology committees
The vast majority of legal acts in the European Community
are not adopted by the legislative authorities (the Council
and the European Parliament), but by the European
Commission.9 Most of these acts are adopted by the
Commission after the Council has conferred imple-
mentation powers on the Commission and a so-called
“comitology” committee, composed of civil servants of
the Member States, has given its opinion on a Commission
proposal. Although among these legal acts there are many
“routine” measures, decisions of enormous political and
economic importance such as the embargo against British
beef in connection with the BSE crisis in 199610 are also
taken according to comitology procedures.
The first comitology committees were established in
the early 1960s when the Council recognised that it
lacked the resources to make all the necessary
implementation rules in the first agricultural market
organisations. However, it did not want to delegate the
implementation powers to the Commission without
keeping some control. The committees – which have
differing legal “weight” depending on the type of
committee – have to give an opinion on an implementation
measure proposed by the Commission before the
Commission can adopt it.
The procedures for adopting EC implementing
measures have been criticised ever since these procedures
were set up in the early 1960s. Many suggestions and
proposals have been made to ensure that decisions of a
legislative nature or with significant budgetary
implications are made following the usual EC legislative
process, i.e. proposed by the Commission and enacted by
the Council either in consultation, co-operation or co-
decision with the European Parliament. The line that
separates routine implementing measures from those
with legislative and budgetary implications is, however,
rather blurred.
The European Court of Justice has in a series of
decisions left it basically to the legislator to distribute the
powers between the legislator and the executive. In cases
where the Council legislates alone, it is for the Council to
decide the content of the basic act and the scope of the
powers that are delegated to the Commission. The Council
has tended to be rather generous in conferring
implementation powers to the Commission since it can
control the Commission through comitology committees.
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choice, the Council enjoys almost complete freedom in
that respect. The European Parliament, which has no
influence on the committee procedures, wants to restrict
the delegation of implementation measures to purely
routine matters. This is the root of the conflict between
the Council and Parliament. In cases where the co-
decision procedure applies, the European Parliament and
the Council have to reach a compromise on what is
decided in the legislative act and what in the implementing
act. Also, the new comitology decision of 28 June 199911
has not addressed the question of what must be decided in
a legislative or in an implementation procedure.
The research questions to be addressed by this
subproject should contribute to a constructive solution to
this important issue of institutional balance by first
establishing the criteria for an operational demarcation
between legislative and implementing measures, and
secondly by assessing a large number of EC implementing
acts to determine whether and in which cases implementing
measures have in fact violated the prerogatives of the
legislators, the Council and Parliament. The subproject
therefore concentrates on the following questions:
• How can the line that separates implementing measures
from those with legislative implications be drawn?
How can the differentiation between legislative and
implementing legal acts be made operational? How
could an effective system of control be established
that limits the implementing powers of the
Commission and safeguards the prerogatives of the
legislators, especially the Parliament?
• Have the prerogatives of the legislative authorities
generally been respected in implementing decisions
in recent years or have decisions with important
legislative implications been decided on according to
comitology procedures? In which policy arenas has
this primarily occurred? In what way have these
possible  “transgressions” affected the institutional
balance?
4. The Committee system, legitimacy, citizen’s
perceptions and acceptance of the EU-system of
governance
The EC system of governance could not function without
the committees. They came into existence in response to
the need to integrate expert knowledge and technical
know-how into the policy decision-making and
implementation process and in response to the need to
provide co-ordination, control, and checks and balances
between the major institutions.
Although the two major functions of committees in
the political process of the European Community –
mastering technical expertise and managing multi-level
co-ordination – are uncontroversial and generally viewed
as legitimate, the EC committee system is at the same
time frequently criticised from different points of view:
Committees are seen as embodying the most opaque
and even secret part of EC decision making. The committee
system is certainly one of its least known aspects. Outside
the participants in the system from the Community
institutions and the Member States, and the small
community of scholars in the legal, social and economic
sciences, the existence and functioning of committee
system is hardly known. Even media reporters who cover
Brussels have little understanding of it. Best known
among the public at large are probably the committees of
the European Parliament, whereas comitology committees
and the working parties of Council are hardly known
outside the group of officials who participate in the
committee work.
This aspect is also of relevance in that part of the
research devoted to an analysis of the committee system
from the perspective of the citizens of the European
Union. Decisions – which are taken by the committees
behind closed doors – are in some cases of a politically
sensitive nature and have direct implications for every
citizen of the European Union. They include measures
taken in the fields of the environment, social affairs, and
research and development.12 Within this context, a question
of particular interest is how the committee system can be
made more legitimate from the perspective of EU citizens.
The new Comitology Decision can be seen as one step in
this direction by improving the public’s access to
information concerning the committee procedures. It
makes the principles and conditions on public access to
Commission documents applicable to committees, and
obliges the Commission to publish a list of all comitology
committees as well as an annual report on the working of
the committees. Also, references to all documents related
to committees which have been sent to the European
Parliament shall be made public in a register.
The committee system raises questions about the
democratic legitimacy of the EC policy process. Because
most of the committees are not mentioned in the Treaties,
their proliferation is sometimes seen as a deviation from
the “constitutional” rules of the European Community.
Committees are frequently seen as symbolising the
“democratic deficit” and “bureaucratic and technocratic
bias” of the EC system, since their members are not
elected on a democratic basis (except for those on the EP
committees).
The major objective of this subproject is to reflect the
results of the other subprojects with a view to answering
the question of to what extend and how the committee
system can contribute to increasing the legitimacy of and
strengthen support for the European system of governance.
Conclusion
The research will contribute to a better understanding of
the decision-making processes in the European
Community and the unique multi-level construction of
the evolving European system of governance. The project
will make the linking of the Member State level and the
Community level through the various types of committees
more transparent and show how technological expertise
is integrated into this process. The project will make a
major contribution to the debate on the “democratic
deficit” of the Community system by showing that the
many forms of checks and balances are an integral part of
the committee system which guarantees the incorporation
of expertise under conditions of mutual control. The
analysis will identify deficiencies and weak points in the
committee system and develop suggestions as to how
they might be corrected. Finally, the project will contribute
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over comitology. The efforts to develop an operational
differentiation between legislative and implementing
measures and to empirically establish how frequently, in
which policy arenas and in what ways implementing
measures have in fact violated the prerogatives of the
legislative authorities, will contribute to making the debate
on comitology more objective and thus help in finding an
adequate solution.
The European Institute of Public Administration with
Professor Günther F. Schäfer as project leader is
responsible for the overall project co-ordination. The
research will be conducted by EIPA faculty members in
co-operation with researchers from the Universities of
Bordeaux, Cologne, Rennes, King’s College, London
and the Institut für Höhere Studien, Vienna. Three
workshops will be held at EIPA in Maastricht in which all
the researchers involved will participate. One meeting
will take place in Brussels in order to present the
intermediary results and findings of the research to the
Commission services and some selected end-users and
policy makers. After the submission of the final report to
the European Commission, a colloquium on the research
findings will be held at EIPA. Finally, it is also intended
that a book will be published on the research findings.
Progress on EIPA’s two-year research project
“Governance by Committee: The Role of Committees in
European Policy Making and Policy Implementation”
can be found on the web, under Working Papers or by
contacting: g.haibach@eipa-nl.com.
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